In Chapter 1 of Evidence and Evolution, Sober (2008) defends a Likelihodist account of favoring. The main tenet of Likelihoodism is the so-called Law of Likelihood. In this note, I explain why the Law of Likelihood fails to undergird an adequate explication of favoring.
Some Background on the Favoring Relation
This (brief) note is about the (evidential) "favoring" relation. Pre-theoretically, favoring is a three-place (epistemic) relation, between an evidential proposition E and two hypotheses H1 and H2. Favoring relations are expressed via locutions of the form:
E favors H1 over H2.
Strictly speaking, favoring should really be thought of as a four-place relation, between E, H1, H2, and a corpus of background evidence K. But, for present purposes (which won't address issues involving K), I will suppress the background corpus, so as to simplify our discussion. Moreover, the favoring relation is meant to be a propositional epistemic relation, as opposed to a doxastic epistemic relation. That is, the favoring relation is not meant to be restricted to bodies of evidence that are possessed (as evidence) by some actual agent(s), or to hypotheses that are (in fact) entertained by some actual agent(s). In this sense, favoring is analogous to the relation of propositional justification -as opposed to doxastic justification (Conee 1980) .
In order to facilitate a comparison of Likelihoodist vs Bayesian explications of favoring, I will presuppose the following bridge principle, linking favoring and evidential support:
• E favors H1 over H2 iff E supports H1 more strongly than E supports H2. Finally, I will only be discussing instances of the favoring relation involving contingent, empirical claims. So, it is to be understood that "favoring" will not apply if any of E, H1, or H2 are non-contingent (and/or non-empirical) . With this background in place, we're ready to begin.
A Popperian Sufficient Condition for Favoring
Here is an eminently plausible sufficient condition for favoring: 1 Likelihoodists may balk at this presupposition. But, as I explain in some detail elsewhere (Fitelson 2007) , without this bridge principle, no meaningful comparison between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism seems possible.
(PP)
If H2 entails ~E but H1 does not entail ~E, then E favors H1 over H2. This is a (weak) "Popperian Principle" concerning the evidential asymmetry between refutation and non-refutation. The Popperian slogan for (PP) would be:
• Non-refuting evidence supports more strongly than refuting evidence.
This slogan expresses the kernel of truth in Popperian Falsificationism. The so-called Law of Likelihood (Sober 2008 , Royall 1997 ) is meant to probabilistically generalize (PP). To wit:
Suppose H1 confers probability p1 on E, and H2 confers probability p2 on E.
Then, E favors H1 over H2 iff p1 > p2.
In other words, (LL) reduces favoring to a comparison of the likelihoods of the H1 and H2, relative to evidence E [viz., p1 = Pr(E | H1) and p2 = Pr(E | H2)]. In the limiting, deductive case involved in (PP), p2 = 0 and p1 > 0. And, in such special cases, every (adequate) theory of favoring will endorse the conclusion implied by (LL) [viz., (PP)]. As such, I accept (PP) as a sufficient condition for favoring, and I think (LL) is OK in these special, "Popperian" cases. However, when we look at the consequences of (LL) for other cases, we can see that it over-generalizes (PP). A useful way to illustrate the nature of (LL)'s over-generalization of (PP) is to consider another, non-Popperian (deductive) sufficient condition for favoring.
A Non-Popperian Sufficient Condition for Favoring
To see why (LL) over-generalizes (PP), consider another (deductive, limiting case) sufficient condition for favoring that I think should be as uncontroversial as (PP):
If E entails H1 and E does not entail H2, then E favors H1 over H2.
Principle (*) can be thought of as a "dual" of Principle (PP). Basically, ( * ) is meant to imply that if E conclusively supports H1, but E non-conclusively supports H2, then E favors H1 over H2. Consequently, the slogan for ( * ) would be:
• Conclusive evidence supports more strongly than non-conclusive evidence.
To my mind, this "dual" of (PP) seems just as plausible as (PP) itself. 2 But, while (PP) is (severally) compatible with each of (LL) and ( * ), it turns out that (LL) is incompatible with principle ( * ). Here is a concrete example illustrating the incompatibility of (LL) and ( * ).
2
If one is a Popperian Falsificationist -in a strong, Critical Rationalist sense (Miller 1994 ) -then one will deny ( * ). But, that version of Falsificationism is false. And, I take it that contemporary defenders of (LL) [e.g., Sober (2008) and Royall (1997) ] do not want to embrace this stronger (and highly implausible) Popperian position. As such, contemporary Likelihoodists will need a different way to argue that (LL) does not over-generalize (PP).
Example. Suppose we have deck of 100 playing cards, and we know nothing about how the cards in the deck are distributed, except for the following two facts: (i) there are some clubs and some red cards in the deck, and (ii) at least one ace of spades is contained in the deck. We shuffle the cards well, and we sample a card (c) at random. Now, consider the following three claims regarding c:
c is a spade. (H1) c is a black card. (H2) c is an ace of spades.
Because E entails H1 and E does not entail H2, ( * ) implies that E favors H1 over H2 in this case (which clearly seems to be the correct verdict). However, because Pr(E | H2) = 1 > Pr(E | H1) > 0, (LL) implies that E favors H2 over H1, which contradicts ( * ). This shows that, while (LL) can be seen as generalizing one sufficient condition for favoring [(PP)], it also contradicts another sufficient condition for favoring [( * )]. 
Bayesian Diagnoses (and Explications)
From a Bayesian point of view, the debate about (LL) is really just a debate about the proper measure of degree of confirmation. Recall our bridge principle connecting favoring and support:
• E favors H1 over H2 iff E supports H1 more strongly than E supports H2.
Bayesian confirmation theory provides various explications of "the degree to which E supports H." These come in the form of various relevance measures c(H,E) of "the degree to E confirms H." For each of these precise Bayesian explications of evidential support, we get a precise confirmation-theoretic bridge principle, of the following kind:
E favors H1 over H2 -according to measure c -iff c(H1,E) > c(H2,E).
Different choices of c lead to different precise Bayesian bridge principles connecting favoring and confirmation. For instance, according to the ratio measure of degree of confirmation:
The entailment relations are inessential to the intuitive verdicts here. A simple modification of Example drives this point home. Suppose that a highly (but imperfectly) reliable witness is going to make three claims about c. The witness is going to report (1) either E or ~E, and (2) either H1 or ~H1, and (3) either H2 or ~H2. Now, preface each of (E), (H1), and (H2) with the following: "The highly (but imperfectly) reliable witness testified that...". This modification does not undermine the intuitive verdict that E favors H1 over H2 in the Example. Moreover, (LL) will (still) give the (intuitively) incorrect verdict here. And, this is despite the fact that there are no entailment relations between the propositions in the revised testimonial rendition of the Example. So, the entailments are inessential to the Example. See (Fitelson 2007) and (Fitelson 2011 ) for more detailed diagnoses and discussions.
If we accept (r), then (LL) follows from the resulting bridge principle (BPr). That is, if we plug c(H,E) = r(H,E) into (BPc), we get (LL). This allows us to see that (LL) is just a consequence of one approach to Bayesian confirmation.
Unfortunately, the ratio-measure approach to Bayesian confirmation (r) is flawed in various ways. Perhaps the most telling objection to (r) is that it entails commutativity of "degree of evidential support" (Eells & Fitelson 2002 ):
For all E and H, c(H,E) = c(E,H).
But, (C) is clearly incorrect, since (e.g.) E might entail H, while H does not entail E. And, in such cases, it is clear that commutativity of evidential support (hence, degree of confirmation) can fail. I think this flaw is one of the underlying reasons why (LL) gives counter-intuitive results, including those which contradict the intuitively compelling sufficient condition for favoring articulated by principle ( * ). There are various (Bayesian) alternatives to (LL)/(r) that are compatible with both (PP) and ( * ), and which do not imply the commutativity of quantitative confirmation. One naïve Bayesian alternative to (LL) would involve a comparison of posteriors Pr(H1 | E) and Pr(H2 | E):
But, this "naïve Bayes" approach to favoring (NB) is also inadequate. Popper (1954) showed that (NB) violates the following sensitivity to evidential relevance requirement:
Suppose E is positively relevant to H1 and E is negatively relevant to H2. Then, E does not favor H2 over H1.
Principle (R) makes sense because favoring is a relation of comparative evidential support. Moreover, (LL) entails (R), so (R) is something that Likelihoodists must (also) accept. In this sense, (R) is common ground between Likelihoodists and Bayesians. That is, anyone who accepts any version of (BPc) must also accept (R). This covers all Bayesian explications of favoringincluding the Likelihoodist [viz., (BPr)/(LL)] approach. To sum up: we seek an (probabilistic) explication of favoring that is compatible with (PP), ( * ), and (R). As it happens, there are many such contenders within the Bayesian stable.
At the quantitative level, there are various measures of confirmation (c) that undergirdvia (BPc) -explications of favoring that are compatible with (PP), ( * ), and (R). For instance,
• Likelihood-ratio-based measures (Good 1984 , Fitelson 2007 , Fitelson 2011 ).
• An alternative to the likelihood-ratio, which has recently been defended by some philosophers and cognitive scientists .
At the qualitative level, there are various sets of probabilistic sufficient conditions for favoring that can be seen as (proper) generalizations of (PP), ( * ), and (R). For instance,
